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What rigorous cost-effectiveness evidence is there of preparedness, pre-financing and early 




2. Rationale for disaster preparedness, pre-financing and early action 






Rigorous evidence of the cost-effectiveness of investments in disaster preparedness is limited. 
However, overall the available data points to disaster preparedness leading to clear reductions in 
both humanitarian costs and losses due to crises (lost lives, assets, livelihoods). While there is 
general consensus on the importance of preparedness, significant challenges mean it still 
accounts for a very small proportion of humanitarian aid. There is a need for more research on 
the impact of disaster preparedness. 
Preparedness1 means putting in place mechanisms which will allow national authorities and relief 
organisations to be aware of risks and deploy staff and resources quickly once a crisis strikes. By 
improving the speed and quality of assistance provided, preparedness can save lives and reduce 
suffering, and increase the value for money of relief action (increasing efficiency and decreasing 
costs). There is an increasing focus on disaster preparedness to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of disaster response and post-response efforts: its importance was underscored at the 
2016 World Humanitarian Summit and provisions for preparedness are included in key 
international agreements and commitments. Despite the general consensus on the importance of 
disaster preparedness, the majority of humanitarian aid continues to be directed towards 
humanitarian response efforts: the proportion allocated to disaster prevention and preparedness 
makes up over 5% of total disaster spending since 2011 (Goldschmidt & Kumar, 2017: 4).  
Disaster preparedness entails a wide range of activities. Financing falls broadly into three areas: 
preparing funds for an early response; financing activities ahead of a disaster (e.g. pre-
positioning supplies and training field staff); and protecting the most vulnerable. As well as 
financing preparedness, it is important to have administrative preparedness through, for 
example, donors streamlining their own administrative procedures, emergency contingency 
partnerships, and incorporating flexibility into development programming. One of the main 
challenges for preparedness is the risk that no emergency materialises, leaving donors with the 
impression that public money was not spent efficiently. Related to this is the limited visibility that 
comes with successful prevention and preparedness, which could also undermine incentives. A 
further challenge highlighted in the literature is the lack of evidence about impact of disaster 
preparedness.  
This review details the evidence from a number of studies of disaster preparedness impact, 
focusing on cost (and time) effectiveness. The literature reviewed was a mixture of academic 
papers and development agency reports. Key findings are as follows: 
 A study examining the economic case for investment in early response and resilience-
building in disaster-prone regions of Kenya and Ethiopia concluded that early response 
was far more cost-effective than late humanitarian response (Fitzgibbon, 2013). Two 
strategies were identified as particularly effective in reducing aid costs: early destocking 
(of animals) and buying food beforehand. Such measures drastically reduced costs.  
 A cost-benefit analysis of emergency preparedness in relation to drought and flood 
hazards in Niger (Kellet & Peters, 2014) found that the benefits of investing in 
                                                   
1 The term ‘preparedness’ is defined by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) as: ‘the ability of 
governments, professional response organisations, communities and individuals to anticipate and respond 
effectively to the impact of likely, imminent or current hazards, events or conditions, the knowledge and 
capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organizations, communities and 
individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard 
events or conditions’ (IASC, 2011, cited in Fabre, 2017: 1). 
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preparedness far outweighed the costs. Estimated benefit-to-cost ratios (BCR) ranged 
(depending on different scenarios) from US$ 3.25 for every US$ 1 spent, to US$ 5.31 
(Kellet & Peters, 2014: 81-82). While the analysis provided a clear financial imperative for 
greater investment in preparedness, the authors stress that this has to be well-designed 
– otherwise it could fail and end up more expensive than ‘business as usual’. 
 A 2015 study by the Boston Consulting Group quantified the cost and time benefits of a 
large and diversified investment ‘portfolio’ of emergency preparedness interventions 
undertaken by UNICEF and WFP in 2014 (BCG, 2015). It found that all the emergency 
preparedness investments examined saved significant time and/or costs in the event of 
an emergency: 75% demonstrated cost savings, with a net saving of $6.4 million, 93% 
saved time, and 64% saved both costs and time. Among the interventions with highest 
return on investment were pre-positioning of emergency supplies, large infrastructure 
projects, and trainings.  
 A 2016 report (Venton, 2016) gives the findings of a Value for Money (VfM) assessment 
of US$ 39.8 million DFID contingency funding that was provided early in the 2015/2016 
Ethiopia drought crisis. Timely procurement with DFID funding was estimated to have 
avoided an additional US$ 6.3-7.4 million that would have been incurred by later 
procurement, an overall saving of approximately 18%.  
 A 2017 report (Venton & Sida, 2017) presents interim findings from a study on the value 
for money (VfM) of DFID multi-year humanitarian funding (MYHF) and contingency 
funding. The greatest value savings (18-29% less than costs of buying in an emergency) 
were identified in Ethiopia through smarter WFP procurement. However, overall the study 
found there was a lot less evidence on anticipated value savings than was expected: this 
could be due to challenges in collecting data.  
 A study examining the relationship between disaster preparation and preparedness 
(DPP) and the cost of humanitarian disaster response looked at data from 2002 to 2014 
of aid received by 156 OECD countries (Goldschmidt & Kumar, 2017). The analysis 
found no support that investment in disaster preparedness reduces the cost of disaster 
response, the number of people affected, or the number of deaths resulting from natural 
disasters. However, the authors stressed that this should not imply a rejection of disaster 
preparedness, but rather promote understanding of why investments weren’t having an 
impact and how to improve upon them. 
 A 2018 report (DEPP, 2018) gives the findings of a study of the return on investment 
(ROI) of DFID’s Disaster and Emergency Preparedness Programme (DEPP)’s capacity 
development investments in Ethiopia and the Philippines. The investments yielded 
positive returns: on average, for each £1 spent, there was a saving of £2.84 (though 
financial ROI took an average of 4.4 years to materialise); an average of 35.4 days 
response time was saved; and there was significant capacity ROI. The report concludes 
that preparedness investments are effective and likely to provide high levels of return, if 
localised; and preparedness benefits greatly from capacity development investments that 
support coordination. However, these need to be long-term. 
Overall, this review found that there was evidence for cost-effectiveness of disaster 
preparedness, pre-financing and early action, but there remains considerable potential to 
increase savings. The literature points to the need for greater research into the impact of different 
disaster preparedness investments – as well as greater allocation of resources for preparedness. 
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2. Disaster preparedness, pre-financing and early action 
Rationale 
Preparedness means putting in place mechanisms which will allow national authorities and relief 
organisations to be aware of risks and deploy staff and resources quickly once a crisis strikes 
(Fabre, 2017: 1). By improving the speed and quality of assistance provided, preparedness can 
make a major difference in saving lives and reducing suffering, and increasing the value for 
money of relief action and ensuring that scarce resources are directed to where they will have 
the greatest impact. Fabre sums up the benefits (Fabre, 2017: 3-4): 
 Preparedness increases efficiency – it means that funds to address humanitarian needs 
when a disaster occurs arrive earlier, aid is delivered faster and efficiency increases; 
 Preparedness decreases costs – prepositioning emergency relief through a regular 
logistical chain and training national and local capacity in an area that is prone to 
recurrent disaster clearly will cost less than flying in emergency relief and international 
experts during an emergency; 
 Preparedness can enhance national and local leadership;  
 Preparedness can increase resilience and can bridge humanitarian and development 
funding; 
 Preparedness decreases the humanitarian carbon footprint. 
Goldschmidt and Kumar (2017) explain that investment in disaster prevention and preparedness 
focuses on two primary outcomes: reducing the cost of humanitarian relief efforts and reducing 
societal social and economic costs of natural disasters. The social cost is measured by the 
number of people affected or needing assistance during the disaster, and the number of people 
killed by a natural disaster. The economic cost of a natural disaster is measured by the amount 
of damages and economic losses related to the disaster (Goldschmidt & Kumar, 2017). 
There is an increasing focus in humanitarian work on emergency preparedness to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of disaster response and post-response efforts (Fabre, 2017). In 
2012 the United Nations launched a social media campaign, ‘Act Now, Save Later’, to highlight 
the benefits of investing in disaster preparedness, asserting that ‘every single dollar of aid spent 
on preventing and mitigating disasters saves an average of seven dollars in humanitarian 
disaster response’ – though no calculations or citations were given to support this cost benefit 
ratio (Goldschidt & Kumar, 2017: 2). In developing countries, the United Nations estimates that 
allocating 10% of aid towards disaster preparedness would protect development gains 
(Goldschmidt & Kumar, 2017: 4). The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit underscored the 
importance of disaster preparedness, and initiated and strengthened a number of preparedness 
measures aimed at reaching an essential level of readiness (Fabre, 2017). The Sustainable 
Development Goals (1.3 and 1.5), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-
2023, the Agenda for Humanity, and Good Humanitarian Donorship (Principle 1) are some of 
main international agreements and commitments with provisions for preparedness (Fabre, 2017: 
4-5).    
Despite the general consensus on the importance of disaster preparedness, there continues to 
be a lack of funding for preparation projects. The majority of humanitarian aid continues to be 
directed towards humanitarian response efforts, with the proportion allocated to disaster 
prevention and preparedness making up over 5% of total disaster spending since 2011 (albeit up 
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from less than 1% of total disaster aid prior to 2007) (Goldschmidt & Kumar, 2017: 4). Fabre 
concludes that ‘the humanitarian financial system remains essentially reactive and focuses on 
responding to disasters rather than preparing for them’ (Fabre, 2017: 3).    
Forms 
There are three main ways to support financing of disaster preparedness, each of which can take 
many forms (Fabre, 2017: 5-12):  
a) Preparing funds for an early response (pre-financing) – making sure that money is 
already available before a disaster hits so that humanitarian actors can start their relief 
operations immediately. This can be through an emergency financial reserve (included in 
humanitarian budgets for unforeseen events requiring urgent funding); building 
contingent capacity (including funding sources) for high probability, high impact disasters 
into planning processes; global and country-based pooled funds (e.g. the UN Central 
Emergency Response Fund, CERF); and the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF). 
b) Preparing partners for early action – financing activities ahead of disaster so that they are 
prepared before the shock, mitigating the impact of disaster on the population. This can 
include emergency supply pre-positioning (stockpiling critical supplies in strategic 
locations) and training field staff to respond; forecast-based financing (FbF) that triggers 
humanitarian action and funding for specific preparedness actions once a certain 
threshold of probability has been reached in forecasts of extreme weather and climate 
conditions; and, investing in the building blocks of a good response (e.g. forecasts, early 
warning systems, disaster risk mapping and analysis, and coordination mechanisms).    
c) Protecting the most vulnerable – is a way for individuals or governmental systems to be 
protected against losses that are induced by a disaster. This can be through social 
protection measures such as social safety nets; climate risk insurance at micro level 
(individuals and households); and disaster risk financing to help countries manage the 
cost of disaster and climate shocks.  
As well as financing preparedness, it is important to have administrative preparedness through, 
for example, donors streamlining their own administrative procedures and improving the flexibility 
of their funding (Fabre, 2017). Emergency contingency partnerships are another useful means to 
pre-position humanitarian aid: arrangements with selected partners or alliances may include 
prepositioned funds or fast track approval processes. Another approach is incorporating flexibility 
into development programming, so that local development partners can be involved in the 
humanitarian response. Crisis modifiers, for example, are provisions that allow the national or 
local actor to move funds from development activities to crisis response, or allow donors to 
provide additional funds for crisis response.  
Challenges 
One of the main perceived risks for preparedness funding is the risk that no emergency 
materialises, leaving donors with the impression that public money was not spent efficiently 
(Fabre, 2017: 13). This could be overcome through ‘no regrets’ programming, which delivers 
results even if no crisis occurs, e.g. cleaning sewage in anticipation of extreme rainfall will benefit 
the population even if disaster doesn’t materialise. Learning from no regrets responses 
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successfully implemented by two NGO resilience consortia in Somalia2 found that ‘community-
led early actions based on early warning information saved flood-vulnerable communities from 
crop losses and were more effective than a humanitarian response after the floods occurred’ 
(IFRC, 2016: 109, cited in Rohwerder, 2017: 10). However one analyst commented that no 
regrets responses had lost momentum partly due to ‘the challenges associated with incentivising 
early action’ as there were reputational and financial risks associated with acting on uncertainty, 
while the limited visibility that comes with successful prevention and preparedness could also 
undermine incentives (Chloe Parrish in ALNAP, 2016: 23, cited in Rohwerder, 2017: 10). 
There are also other non-financial challenges to disaster preparedness, including: semantics – 
definitions and meanings of key emergency preparedness terms are not shared across different 
actors; lack of ‘joined-up’ understanding of all risks – knowledge is often parcelled out amongst 
particular actors within their own sectors; weak government frameworks and institutions; lack of a 
systematic approach and of planning for emergency preparedness; and unclear roles and 
responsibilities, especially amongst the international community (Kellet & Peters, 2014: 12).     
A further challenge highlighted in the literature is the lack of evidence about impact of disaster 
preparedness. ‘Little evidence has been collected to date to demonstrate the impact of early 
preparedness investments on eventual humanitarian response’ (BCG, 2015: 2). ‘There remains 
limited research on both disaster preparedness and the impact of preparation on disaster and 
post-disaster response’ (Goldschmidt & Kumar, 2017: 2). Fabre (2017) notes that many 
preparedness activities are relatively easy to monitor when they aim to put in place capacity, 
processes and items ahead of a crisis, when constraints are less critical than during the crisis 
response. ‘The impact of such activities, however, is much harder to assess, making political 
buy-in difficult to gain’ (Fabre, 2017: 13). Fabre (2017: 14) concludes: ‘research is still needed to 
define the most impactful elements of preparedness and their interaction in reducing suffering 
and costs during a crisis’.  
The remainder of this review details the evidence from a number of studies of disaster 
preparedness impact, focusing on cost (and time) effectiveness.  
3. Rigorous evidence of cost-effectiveness  
Fitzgibbon, C. (2013). The economics of early response and disaster resilience: 
lessons from Kenya 
This article gives the key findings from a study commissioned by DFID to examine the economic 
case for investment in early response and resilience-building in disaster-prone regions. The 
study looked at Kenya and Ethiopia with a specific focus on the pastoral lowlands typical of many 
drought-affected areas in the wider region. It compared costs of three different approaches or 
‘storylines’:  
 Late humanitarian response 
 Early humanitarian response 
                                                   
2 Somalia Resilience Programme (SomReP) and Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) – these 
operated during the 2015 El Nino season when early warning indicators pointed to large-scale flooding across 
parts of southern Somalia (Rohwerder, 2017: 10). 
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 Building resilience to disasters. 
Given the focus of this literature review, it is the findings with regard to early vs. late response 
that are relevant. The study concluded that early response is far more cost-effective than late 
humanitarian response: ‘Early response ensures that assistance arrives before households have 
to resort to negative coping strategies such as selling productive assets like core breeding stock’ 
(Fitzgibbon, 2013: 28). Two strategies are identified as particularly effective in reducing aid costs:  
 Early destocking – in pastoral communities facilitating early destocking (via commercial 
sale) of quality animals (can) reduce aid costs. If pastoral households can convert high-
value animals into cash before their condition declines they can use the income to 
maintain the condition of their remaining animals and feed themselves without food aid; 
 Buying food beforehand – the cost of buying food aid during a crisis, as against buying it 
beforehand, is inflated. The study estimated that food (and cash) transfers usually 
represent 60-80% of total humanitarian assistance.  
The combined effect of purchasing cheaper food earlier and reducing the number of people in 
need drastically reduces costs. Fitzgibbon acknowledges government and donor concerns about 
releasing humanitarian funds early in response to early warning reports for fear that they could 
end up funding a ‘non-disaster’, but claims that even allowing for that risk there are cost savings: 
‘In fact, the study points out that donors could mistakenly fund two early responses in Kenya, and 
seven in Ethiopia, before the cost matches than of even one late humanitarian response’ 
(Fitzgibbon, 2013: 28).   
Kellet, J. & Peters, K. (2014). Dare to prepare: taking risk seriously. Financing 
emergency preparedness: from fighting to managing risk. 
This report includes a cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis of emergency preparedness in 
relation to flood and drought hazards in Niger.  
The total estimated costs of emergency preparedness, as articulated in the Government of 
Niger’s annual support plan and its flood risk management plan, are US$ 47.9 million per year 
(Kellet & Peters, 2014: 81). The benefits of emergency preparedness have been articulated as 
(Kellet & Peters, 2014: 81):  
a) Reduced unit cost of response – WFP Niger estimated that pre-planning in response to 
drought could reduce aid costs (food and non-food aid) to 89% of the cost under a 
scenario without any pre-planning, based largely on reduced costs of cereal prices and 
transport costs. These savings would also be applicable to flooding and conflict; 
b) Reduced caseloads – modelling suggests that an early response to a high magnitude 
drought would lead to 51% of caseloads under a late response, further reducing annual 
humanitarian response costs; 
c) Reduced losses – the analysis looked at three potential scenarios for reduced losses 
(associated with lost lives, assets and livelihoods) due to the impact of a crisis as a result 
of emergency preparedness. Even under the most conservative assumption, losses were 
estimated to decrease by 10%, and under the least conservative by 30%. 
The costs and benefits outlined above were input into a 20-year model to estimate the costs of 
emergency preparedness as compared with the benefits, monetised in terms of avoided costs of 
aid and disaster losses. Because of the number of assumptions involved, three scenarios were 
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modelled. The benefit-to-cost ratio (BCR) was positive across all scenarios. In the most 
conservative scenario it was estimated that US$ 3.25 of benefit would be generated for every 
US$ 1 spent, rising to US$ 5.31 of benefit in the least conservative scenario (Kellet & Peters, 
2014: 82).   
The authors conclude that the findings provide ‘indicative evidence that there is a clear financial 
imperative for greater investment in effective preparedness in the country. The monetary benefits 
of investing in preparedness…clearly outweigh the costs’ (Kellet & Peters, 2014: 11). However, 
they stress that the effectiveness of an emergency preparedness plan will depend on its design – 
one that is not carefully designed could fail to deliver outcomes and hence ultimately be more 
expensive than ‘business as usual’ (Kellet & Peters, 2014: 83).   
Boston Consulting Group (2015). UNICEF/WFP Return on Investment for Emergency 
Preparedness Study 
This study by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) claims to be one of the first research initiatives 
to quantify the cost and time benefits of a large and diversified investment ‘portfolio’ of 
emergency preparedness interventions undertaken by UNICEF and WFP in 2014. The aim was 
to build an evidence base for a return on investment (ROI)3 for preparedness to: 
 identify opportunities to reduce costs and increase the speed of humanitarian response;  
 assess planned and existing preparedness investments in terms of potential cost savings 
and response time;   
 compare different preparedness interventions along these two dimensions.  
The study looked at 49 emergency preparedness investments in three pilot countries: Chad, 
Pakistan and Madagascar. The investments spanned across four main operational areas 
(logistics, procurement, staffing and partnerships/external contracting) and covered UNICEF and 
WFP activities under the DFID Humanitarian Programme funding for emergency preparedness 
from January 2014 through the end of 2014 (BCG, 2015: 2). 
Key findings from the study were: 
 All the UNICEF and WFP emergency preparedness investments examined saved 
significant time and/or costs in the event of an emergency; 
 Cost savings – 75% of preparedness investments examined demonstrated cost savings 
beyond the amount of the initial investment. $5.6 million was invested in the 49 
preparedness activities examined. These interventions saved a total of $12 million toward 
future humanitarian response for a net saving of $6.4 million; 
 Time savings – 93% of preparedness investments examined saved time toward 
humanitarian response – no investment slowed down humanitarian response. Response 
time was speeded up by 2 to 50 days, or an average of more than one week.   
 64% of preparedness investments saved both costs and time. 
The authors say their research demonstrates that humanitarian preparedness is complex and 
must be tailored to context. Investments with high returns in one country do not necessarily 
                                                   
3 The ROI (return on investment) is a financial measure in which an ROI rate of 1 indicates that future costs will 
be reduced by the same initial investment amount. All rates greater than 1 indicate a higher cost saving than the 
original investment (BCG, 2015: 3). 
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indicate similarly high returns if implemented in another country. However, drawing on trends 
within the data collected and analysed for the study, they suggest some patterns (BCG, 2015: 3):  
 Pre-positioning of internationally-sourced emergency supplies yield ROIs in the 
magnitude of 1.6 – 2.0 and significant time savings of 14 to 21 days on average across 
all pilot countries. Analysis based on anticipated future needs suggests that quantities 
pre-positioned as emergency supplies in the pilot countries could be increased without 
risk of spoilage or financial loss.  
 Large infrastructure investments (e.g. in airstrips) yield the highest absolute money 
savings;  
 Trainings may yield by far the highest financial ROIs (1.3-18.7) due to their relatively 
limited initial investments and large potential cost savings, but this type of investment 
also requires the need to retain the trained staff and to ensure a high quality of training;  
 The more dependent a country is on external goods and services, the higher the ROI of 
an investment ensuring their availability in an emergency situation (primacy of available 
goods over non-available ones);  
 For countries with higher coping capacities, the ROIs for more basic emergency 
preparedness investments fade, with higher value shifting to those in human capital (e.g., 
training) and organizational capacity (e.g., additional resources);  
 All investments have various additional qualitative benefits (e.g., higher reliability, local 
expertise development, spillover to the broader humanitarian community or long-term 
multiplier effects) that were not quantified but further increase the value of the 
investments. 
The authors conclude that ‘given the magnitude of the ROI of most investments, it appears that 
there is still a large gap between potential savings from preparedness investments and the actual 
cost of humanitarian response’ (BCG, 2015: 4). They call for early funding toward emergency 
preparedness, while stressing that this does not remove the need for donor support for 
humanitarian response – rather a more balanced resource allocation approach should be taken 
between preparedness and response activities in high-risk settings. They also recommend 
diversifying preparedness investments across a spread of intervention areas ‘since the 
operational preparedness gains examined in this study showed strong interdependence in 
realizing maximum cost- and time-savings’ (BCG, 2015: 4). Finally, they stress that 
contextualized analysis is necessary for evaluating the relative merits of investments in different 
situations.  
Venton, C. (2016). The Economic Case for Early Humanitarian Response to the 
Ethiopia 2015/2016 Drought 
This report gives the findings of a Value for Money (VfM) assessment of DFID contingency 
funding that was provided early in the 2015/2016 Ethiopia drought crisis. The hypothesis was 
that timely humanitarian funding – funding provided early, at the first signs of a crisis – should 
bring efficiency and effectiveness gains to the overall response. The study was part of a wider 
evaluation of DFID multi-year funding and resilience in protracted crises (see below, Venton & 
Sida, 2017). Contingency funding was defined as additional early funding triggered in response 
to the crisis through existing pipelines. 
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The analysis looked at the overall response to the Ethiopian drought to assess the additional cost 
of the funding shortfall as of 31 March 2016. It estimated the cost required to meet the unfunded 
part of the Humanitarian Requirements Document (HRD) (released in December 2015 calling for 
US$ 1.4 billion in humanitarian aid to reach 10.2 million people in need) by comparing three 
scenarios: the cost to procure on time, the cost of late procurement and the cost of no response. 
Most relevant to this review are the financial cost savings from early DFID funding.  
DFID provided US$ 39.8 million in early funding for food and treatment of severe acute 
malnutrition (SAM). Timely procurement with DFID funding was estimated to have avoided an 
additional US$ 6.3-7.4 million that would have been incurred by later procurement, an overall 
saving of approximately 18%. However, early funding had far less impact on water supply, which 
required more time to set up and get working properly (Venton, 2016: 32). 
While the study findings indicate that DFID contingency funding provided early in the crisis 
played a significant role in delivering VfM gains, it also indicated that the costs associated with 
the remaining deficit could measure in the hundreds of millions of dollars in procurement and 
economic costs. It concludes: ‘This analysis…..shows the necessity for funding models to 
respond to the first signs of a crisis. Flexible funding, for example through multi-year 
humanitarian funding models with built-in contingency mechanisms, can allow shifts in funding 
depending on need and can help to stimulate more timely response resulting in significant cost 
savings’ (Venton, 2016: 7).  
Venton, C. & Sida, L. (2017). The Value for Money of Multi-Year Humanitarian Funding: 
Emerging Findings 
In 2014, DFID introduced multi-year humanitarian funding (MYHF) for protracted conflicts. DFID 
subsequently commissioned a thematic evaluation focused on protracted crises, using Ethiopia, 
Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Pakistan as case studies. A number of 
potential value savings were hypothesised for MYHF. This report presents interim findings from 
the study to date (2017) on the value for money (VfM) of MYHF and contingency funding, 
summarising emerging findings.  
With regard to value savings, the greatest value savings (to date) were identified in Ethiopia 
through smarter WFP procurement. ‘By purchasing at the optimal time, WFP spent between 18 
and 29% less than if they had had to buy in the heat of an emergency. Even compared to routine 
purchasing there look to be significant gains from longer term predictable funding, as it allows for 
better planning. There were also some modest staffing cost savings’ (Venton & Sida, 2017: 3). 
The study found that the area of planning appeared to be the main gain associated with MYHF. 
The best example of this was seen in DRC where UNICEF was using MYHF for a cash transfer 
programme for people displaced by conflict. The agency managed to reduce delivery costs by 
giving fewer, larger grants. 
The report noted that, whilst the promise of MYHF was becoming clearer, there were still 
significant hurdles to its implementation. ‘Most significantly, much of the MYHF examined in this 
study still ends up being effectively short term in nature. This is either because agencies do not 
pass on the multi-year benefits to sub-grantees (‘pass through’), or because their systems do not 
allow them to work longer term’ (Venton & Sida, 2017: 4). In Ethiopia, for example, both OCHA 
and UNHCR were in receipt of MYHF but neither was able to fund partners for longer than a 
year. WFP in Ethiopia also used DFID MYHF in the same way as other donor financing, against 
a plan of emergency food distribution worked out every six months. By contrast, UNICEF in DRC 
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took a longer-term planning perspective and also signed grants longer than a year with its 
partners. ACF was the other MYH partner in DRC, operating an emergency nutritional response 
model. Interventions were in response to spikes in malnutrition and were mostly short-term in 
nature (once the situation is stabilised ACF withdraws). ‘MYHF ensures this capacity to respond 
is in place, an entirely positive outcome, but it does not lead to different approaches’ (Venton & 
Sida, 2017: 4). They sum up the challenge: 
Systems have been built over many years to deliver short term programming, and these 
cannot be unravelled overnight. In fact, the very word humanitarian has become 
synonymous with short term intervention, a significant philosophical and psychological 
barrier to implementing longer term approaches in crises labelled humanitarian (Venton  
& Sida, 2017: 5). 
They conclude that benefits in terms of planning, programme design and a change in approach 
remained tentative in the programmes examined and a lot more work would be needed to ensure 
such gains become routine. 
The authors found there was a lot less evidence on anticipated value savings than was expected. 
Aside from the WFP example highlighted above for Ethiopia, VfM data was surprisingly thin 
despite significant efforts to collect this. While the study acknowledges that agencies clearly have 
trouble collecting the data as it is complex and costly, it finds ‘there is a major gap in terms of 
data to prove the value case, meaning the hypothesis that MYHF can lead to more efficient aid is 
only partly proven’ (Venton & Sida, 2017: 6).  
Goldschmidt, K. & Kumar, S. (2017). Reducing the cost of humanitarian operations 
through disaster preparation and preparedness 
This paper examines the relationship between disaster preparation and preparedness (DPP) and 
the cost of humanitarian disaster response. The authors hypothesise that increased investment 
in disaster preparation and preparedness will reduce the need for future emergency response 
efforts, thus driving down costs.  
To analyse this they looked at data from 2002 (the first year of investment in disaster prevention 
and preparedness) through 2014 of aid received by 156 OECD countries (Goldschmidt & Kumar, 
2017: 4). They included three subgroups of humanitarian aid: emergency response (ER); 
reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation (RRR); and disaster prevention and preparedness. The 
dataset included a total of 126,086 humanitarian aid disbursements over the time period 2002-
2014. They also collected data over the same period on societal social and economic cost 
metrics from the EM-DAT: International Disaster Database of 5,745 natural disasters in 179 
countries, filtering this to include only the 154 countries listed in the OECD dataset (Goldschmidt 
& Kumar, 2017: 4). Global development data was collected from the World Bank data catalogue 
from 2002 to 2014 for the 154 OECD countries, and additional data from the Yearbook of 
International Organizations on the number of active NGOs and intergovernmental organisations 
(IGOs) active in those countries. The authors claim theirs is the first study they know of that 
investigates aggregate funding – previous studies have relied on individual case studies.  
The combined data was used to address the following research questions:  
 How does investing in post-disaster reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation (RRR), and 
pre-disaster DPP impact future disaster response costs? 
 How do social and development indicators contribute to disaster response costs? 
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With regard to findings, the analysis found no support that investment in disaster preparedness 
reduces the cost of disaster response, the number of people affected, or the number of deaths 
resulting from natural disasters. Moreover, investments in DPP the previous year significantly 
increased the cost of responding to natural disasters. Including RRR in the analysis did not 
change this finding – that investment in DPP the previous year increases ER costs. The authors 
also found that the number of NGOs and IGOs within a country – a large presence would be 
expected to reduce ER costs – has no significant effect on disaster response costs. Looking at 
whether the logistics capabilities of a country reduced the cost of ER, they again found no 
support for this.     
Despite the negative findings, Goldschmidt and Kumar stress that these ‘should not spurn 
disaster preparedness, but rather promote further understanding of why the existing investments 
are having no impact and how to improve upon the existing disaster preparedness processes 
such that they achieve their intended purposes’ (2017: 2). They present a number of possible 
explanations for their findings (Goldschmidt & Kumar, 2017: 11-12): 
 There is a lack of clarity as to what investments are being made in DPP, and whether the 
types of investments have changed over the past two decades. Further details would 
allow for a more complete analysis: it is possible that existing DPP investments are 
having a significant impact. Further details would also provide insights into what 
investments work and what investments don’t work; 
 Perhaps not enough is being invested in disaster prevention. There is the possibility that 
there is a tipping point for disaster preparedness investments, and that only once the 
level of investment reaches this tipping point would there be returns or benefits on the 
investment; 
 There exists anecdotal evidence that over time, without the appropriate level of 
maintenance and repair or reinforcement, there is a reduction in the effectiveness of 
preparation investments; 
 One of the critical project characteristics that could differentiate projects that successfully 
reduce future disaster response costs is the scale and scope of the project. When 
examining the prior literature, many of the case studies focused on large-scale projects 
(e.g. dam construction), which we believe are more likely to reduce future disaster costs. 
In our data….about 93% of projects have budgets of less than a million dollars. 
DEPP (2018). DEPP Return on Investment Study: Final Report 
In 2014, DFID launched the Disasters and Emergency Preparedness Programme (DEPP), a 
three-year, £40 million programme aimed at significantly improving the speed and quality of 
humanitarian response in countries at risk of natural disasters or conflict-related emergencies 
(DEPP, 2018: 6). This report gives the findings of a study, conducted between October 2017 and 
May 2018, of the return on investment (ROI) of DEPP’s capacity development investments in 
Ethiopia and the Philippines. The analysis used the ROI methodology first developed by the 
Boston Consulting Group (BCG) in 2015. It relies on carefully analysing and comparing how a 
humanitarian response in different risk scenarios would occur with and without the investment 
having been made. A total of 11 capacity development investments in Ethiopia and the 
Philippines, collectively valued at £3,874,424 were appraised (DEPP, 2018: 4).  
The key findings of the study were as follows (DEPP, 2018: 12): 
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 Financial savings - The investments yielded positive returns. Averaged across all 
investments analysed in this study, for each £1 spent, there is a saving of £2.84. The 
greatest financial returns are obtained by investing in local staff and organisational 
efficiency. On average, investments in capacity development for preparedness start 
yielding a positive financial ROI after 4.4 years.  
 Time savings - The preparedness investments that were analysed were found to enable 
time savings that are likely to save lives. Across the investments analysed, an average of 
35.4 days was saved, with community empowerment yielding the highest time ROI. This 
figure was far lower in the Philippines than in Ethiopia, pointing to the importance of 
country context as an enabler of high-potential investments.  
 Capacity ROI - Investments focused at the organisational level provided the highest 
score at an individual level. Specifically, investments that empower local communities as 
humanitarian actors, those that fill humanitarian skills gaps and those that enable faster 
and more appropriate responses through enhanced data gathering seem to offer the 
most potential.    
Overall, the findings indicate that capacity development investments, though at times hard to 
appraise, are among the most promising in terms of humanitarian results. The time taken to yield 
a positive financial ROI implies that decision-makers can only make the case for preparedness 
as a source of financial savings by taking a long-term view. This may have ramifications for 
humanitarian planning processes that may not always encourage such foresight, particularly 
donor-funded programmes that are of shorter duration and expected to produce results within 
these shorter timeframes.    
The report concludes that: preparedness investments are effective and likely to provide high 
levels of return, if localised; and preparedness benefits greatly from capacity development 
investments that support coordination. However, investments in capacity development for 
humanitarian preparedness need to be long-term (DEPP, 2018: 18). 
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